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Abstract
Network datasets are necessary for many types of net-
work research. While there has been signiﬁcant discussion
about speciﬁc datasets, there has been lessabout the overall
state of network data collection. The goal of this paper is
to explore the research questions facing the Internet today,
the datasets needed to answer those questions, and the chal-
lenges to using those datasets. We suggest several practices
that have proven important in use of current data sets, and
open challenges to improve use of network data.
1 Introduction
Computer network research has long depended on a
number of techniques, from reasoning and proof; to mod-
eling and simulation; to experiments, from small-scale lab-
oratories of a few PCs to large-scale testbeds such as Emu-
lab [73] and PlanetLab [4]. While these tools all have a role,
experience has shown that the Internet is inevitably more di-
verse and variable than we anticipate [55]. Direct study of
the Internet itself is therefore an essential complement to
the above tools—observation can provide the data to feed
models, simulations, and experiments.
Unfortunately, direct observation of the Internet is quite
challenging. The Internet is highly distributed—no central
measurements have been possible since the NSFnet back-
bone was superseded in the mid-1990s [13]. In addition, as
theInternethas been integrated withpeople’s lives and busi-
nesses, very important privacy and legal protections have
arisen [47].
Yet when gathered, data can be quite inﬂuential. As
some examples: Paxon’s study of pairwise TCP exchanges
inﬂuenced TCP design and our understanding of network
trafﬁc [53]. Access to BGP routing updates made possi-
ble with the Route Views Project [58] and has advanced
research and practice through scores of papers and new ap-
proaches to ISP relationships [20], routing [38], network
efﬁciency [63], problem detection [12], and related topics.
While relatively few packet traces are available, they have
been very inﬂuential in denial-of-service, worm, and virus
detection. While Route Views and packet traces shine
light on only a fraction of the Internet today, their wide use
and impact illustrates the promise of relevant network data.
The goal of this paper is to explore some of the research
questions facing the Internet today, the datasets needed to
answer those questions, and the challenges to using those
datasets. Our thesis is that recently available datasets enable
new research, but that continued work is needed to make
new data available to address open research needs.
2 Research Questions
What are the key research questions that should drive
Internet research today? A U.S. National Research Coun-
cil report posed three grand goals: measuring the Inter-
net, modeling networks, and disruptive prototypes [52]. In-
spired by this report, CAIDA has conducted two “Day in the
Life of the Internet” collection events [33]. But what are the
more speciﬁc questions we should look for, and what data
to answer them? Table 1 summarizes a number of important
research topics, some of which we expand below.
Answering the overall question of what networking re-
search is both very important and very difﬁcult; we can-
not possibly provide a complete description of the research
space here. Instead, we seek to highlight a range of key
questions that hopefully illustrate the space. We refer in-
terested readers to the above NRC report [52] and other
concurrent and subsequent reports for a fuller picture (for
example, [60]).
2.1 Understanding Network Traﬃc
Network trafﬁc has long been an area of study. Just as
topology is studied at different levels, trafﬁc has been stud-
ied as individual ﬂows, aggregates on a link, or trafﬁc ma-
trices of the Internet.
Study of network trafﬁc has had two main goals: char-
acterizing typical trafﬁc, and characterizing atypical, often
malicious, trafﬁc. The overall goal is to understand what
1Table 1. General topics in network research and applications in those topics.
topic applications
network trafﬁc
typical trafﬁc protocol design, congestion control, router buffer sizing, trafﬁc modeling, new trafﬁc types
atypical trafﬁc malware detection: denial-of-service attacks, worm, virus spread, malware; spyware; unusual
trafﬁc types; protocol veriﬁcation
network topology
AS-level understanding business relationships
router- or link-level evaluation of network robustness, cross-section throughput, network coordinate systems
address-level evaluation of network size
topology and trafﬁc localizing attack sources, mapping network to geography, physical cross-section throughput
trafﬁc dominates the Internet and how it affects trafﬁc en-
gineering, network architectures, and design of protocols,
routers, ﬁrewalls, and other network appliances. Of course,
understanding typical network trafﬁc is a very broad re-
search area; we provide a few representative examples be-
low to illustrate how traces are used here.
Examples of studies of individual ﬂows have often fo-
cused on TCP [53], or characterization of ﬂows by size [69],
duration [8], burstiness [59], or combinations of these [39].
Studies of individual ﬂows are important to improve cur-
rent protocols and understand how they will interact with
new protocols. Studies of aggregate trafﬁc include statis-
tics of NSFnet [13], discovery of self-similarity in network
trafﬁc [40], to characterizations of trafﬁc matrices [44]. An
understanding of aggregate trafﬁc is essential for medium-
and long-term planning and trafﬁc engineering [17, 19]. To
date, study of network trafﬁc has typically been done in
consort with creation of new measurement infrastructure,
or inside commercial ISPs. While the creation of trace in-
frastructure is understood relatively well today, we suggest
that long-term evaluation of network trends requires analy-
sis of through common datasets by multiple parties, some-
thing not generally possible today.
Internet trafﬁc has been long studied; it might seem that
there is little more to learn. However, the openness of
the Internet means new applications constantly arise. Re-
cent study of individual trafﬁc has focused on new applica-
tions such as peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing [31, 14, 3], VOIP [6],
YouTube video [10] and IPTV [11]. While studies of ag-
gregate trafﬁc have examined how these new applications
have changed the trafﬁc mix, we believe their is beneﬁt to
observing their behavior as they evolve from niche to main-
stream. Part of the beneﬁt includes new trafﬁc models and
user behavior, which are helpful in tuning anomaly detec-
tion.
Growth of malware and spam have prompted the detec-
tion of atypical Internet trafﬁc. Several broad approaches
have been considered, including entropy-based [22],
change-point [64], parametric methods [24, 65] While these
approaches use very different mathematical models to dis-
tinguish between typical and atypical trafﬁc, all require ex-
amples of both attack and known non-attack trafﬁc to eval-
uate their effectiveness and their rate of false positives.
Complementary to trafﬁc detection, problems from mal-
ware can be avoided through protocol veriﬁcation and soft-
ware engineering techniques that reduce the number of
bugs. In this case, traces can provide examples of protocols
operating in unexpected ways, or of bugs being exploited.
In addition, characterizations of atypical trafﬁc are con-
stantly changing. Atypical trafﬁc is often malicious; the
adversarial relationship between malware authors and net-
work operators leads to an arms race of continual evolution.
This interaction stresses the importance of not just getting
traces, but continuing to get new traces (Section 4.4).
2.2 Understanding Network Topology
That trafﬁc must run over some network topology—a
collection of links, LANs, and routers. Understanding the
network topology is essential to understand the fragility or
resilience of the Internet to attack or failure, developing
models of network economics, developing services depen-
dent on network location such as caching or replication, and
other similar problems.
Internet topology was of wide interest in 2001–2002,
with Skitter [27], Rocketfuel [62] and Mercator [63]. Stud-
ies considered both topology at the AS-level and router-
level. Data from those studies has been essential to reﬁne
earlier observations about Internet topology [18] to reﬂect
physical constraints [41].
Although the core Internet topology has been widely
studied, some questions remain open, such as what is the
least-cut diameter of the Internet, particularly when routing
policies are considered. A full understanding of interac-
tions between routing policy and raw connectivity is also
pending.
We see a resurgence in interest in Internet topology, but
now going to the edges of the network. While a num-
2ber of groups have maintained manual lists of dynamically-
assigned addresses, Xie et al. have inferred this information
for accesses to e-mail provider logs [74]. Trestian et al. de-
veloped a classiﬁcation method for addresses based on their
presence on the web, as shown through the Google search
engine [70]. We have been conducting census of all Internet
addresses for several years [26]. Each of these approaches
propose a new methodology and some direct applications;
we believe their real power will arise as others apply the
data in new ways.
Open questions in the core topology of the Internet are:
how many Internet hosts are there, really? How many
clients or servers?
2.3 Where Topology and Traﬃc Meet
Although trafﬁc and topology have been studied in iso-
lation, their combination provides a very compelling open
area of research. The interaction of trafﬁc is at the core of
trafﬁc engineering, and it also has bearing on policy issues
such as network neutrality.
The trafﬁc matrix is the ﬁrst step in this direction [44],
but trafﬁc matrices have usually been studied only in the
context of a single ISP. What is Internet-wide trafﬁc like?
A second open area at the intersection of trafﬁc and
topology is to bring trafﬁc into the physical world. Can
we relate trafﬁc with its geographic location? What will
this tell us about caching policies, network provisioning, or
geolocation of speciﬁc ﬂows?
Finally, while the rest of Section 2 has focused on using
network data to directly address problems facing the Inter-
net today, there is an important indirect effect as well: data
can be used to design, populate, and validate network simu-
lations and models. Since simulation and modeling creates
an isolated, malleable version of a subset Internet, it can be
incredibly valuable in studying focused research questions.
However, researchers must understand the relationship be-
tween what is modeled and the real world, if they expect
their conclusions to reﬂect those constraints. The ﬁeld of
veriﬁcation, validation, and accreditation of network simu-
lations is an important area [25], yet one that can be chal-
lenging to apply in practice [37].
3 Classes of Data
Today, several research groups collect various types of
data, both for their own research purposes and to provide
data to the community through repositories such as PRE-
DICT [68], for general Internet data, and CRAWDAD [35],
for wireless networking. These systems store a large vari-
ety of data. As one example, PREDICT’s privacy impact
assessment lists 17 types of data [43].
To make sense of this data, we group these examples into
several classes in Table 2 (this table is a new organization
based on data assembled by Jody Westby and contributed
by PREDICT participants). We consider data that is either
local or network-wide, and either directly observed, or in-
ferred from some analysis. Our focus in this paper and this
table is on real-world datasets; we omit artiﬁcial or simu-
lated approximations of these datasets here.
Each class of data can address different type of research
questions. For example, locally observed data allows de-
tailed drill-down into communication, providing a play-by-
play account of security events, and in conjunction with
packet-level traces, enabling the modeling or detection of
malicious trafﬁc. Locally observed events can provide a
high-level description of ”what happened”, and network-
wide observed data can observe global events such as worm
outbreaks, routing failures and preﬁx hijacks.
The table lists providers of particular data types, both as
part of the PREDICT program [68], or other public sources.
It’s important that several important data types are unavail-
able (to the best of our knowledge). Typically this data
is limited because of privacy concerns; we expand on this
point below in Section 4.2.
Finally, it is important that these data sources not sim-
ply be available in passing, but that there be datasets that
large, representative, and public. Anyone can take full,
unanonymized packet headers or system logs from their
own computer, yet the generality of results drawn from such
a dataset is much more limited than that taken from a large
public network, or better still, from several different cate-
gories of large networks.
4 Lessons Learned
We next reﬂect on our experiences using trace data in
research to ﬁnd common problems that cut across types of
data. We consider privacy issues, research requirements,
and the nature of what we are observing.
4.1 Privacy and Anonymization
The data classes presented in Section 3 pose quite differ-
ent privacy challenges; we next consider several categories
of challenges.
First, observations that capture user data are most sen-
sitive. This category includes locally observed data such as
fullpacketcontents(includingdatapayloads). Whilepoten-
tially very useful, since it would enable deep packet inspec-
tion and so could provide ground truth for application or
malware detection, this data is not currently available. The
problem is that user data poses signiﬁcant privacy and legal
issues (see [47] for a discussion of these issues), thus such
data can rarely be provided to researchers, and is almost
3Table 2. List of data classes, instances of that class, and providers of that data (partially derived from
data assembled by Jody Westby).
class examples (formats) Providers Privacy Concerns
local observations packet headers for general links CAIDA [9], LANDER [72], addresses
(pcap or ERF) LBNL [54]
packet headers for events such as attacks or CAIDA, LANDER, addresses
worm spread (pcap or ERF) MERIT [71], LBNL
full packet contents (pcap or ERF) unavailable user data and addresses
ﬂow-level traces (netﬂow) MERIT addresses
router statistics (SNMP) - -
local inferences intrusion detection alerts (Snort, Bro, etc.) unavailable addresses and system data
logs (syslog, ﬁrewall, spam) LogAnalysis.org [5] addresses and system data
network-wide active IP addresses unavailable general addresses
observations DNS requests unavailable user data
BGP tables MERIT, RouteViews [58] -
end-host scans (ping or nmap) LANDER addresses
topology scans (traceroute) CAIDA general addresses
VOIP call records PCH [48] addresses
network-wide BGP hijackings (PHAS, bgpmon) unavailable -
inferences darknet/telescope packet headers (pcap) CAIDA, MERIT addresses
darknet/telescope full packets (pcap) CAIDA, MERIT addresses and user data
IP reputations Spamhaus [1] addresses
never shared without a legal warrant. We are not aware of
any such data being available to researchers, even from their
home institution.
Second is data that contains IP or MAC addresses (but
not user data); examples include packet headers, ﬂow
records, and system logs. IP addresses pose a privacy con-
cern because it is sometimes possible to relate them to
the identities of individual humans; although not explic-
itly listed in relevant laws, there is general consensus that
theyconstitute“personallyidentifyinginformation”forpur-
poses of U.S. and E.U. privacy laws. It is important to note
that IP addresses by themselves do not identify users. Par-
ticularly with widespread use of dynamic addresses, IP ad-
dresses often must be combined with external information,
such as user registration, DHCP logs, or application speciﬁc
cookies, to map them to users. However, such mapping in-
formation is often maintained (sometimes to satisfy legal or
operational requirements), and has been used under warrant
to resolve IP addresses to users (even if incorrectly [56]).
Because of privacy concerns about IP addresses, sev-
eral anonymization techniques have been proposed, such
as preﬁx-preserving cryptographic-based renumbering [75].
Preﬁx preserving techniques are very useful to researchers
because they preserve the structure of the network. Such ap-
proaches must be applied carefully, however, renumbering
all user-speciﬁc ﬁelds (IP and MAC addresses) in headers
and packet contents. Consistent renumbering schemes are
also subject to attacks using external information (possibly
injected by the attacker), or statistical analysis searching for
well known, popular hosts [15], or common patterns such as
sequential scans [49]. For MAC addresses, the options are
toscramblethevendorandaddressportionsoftheaddresses
as one unit or independently [49].
Full address anonymization makes it difﬁcult to as-
sociate trafﬁc with organizations and makes some kinds
of research impossible. For example, reverse engineer-
ing worm random-number generators [36] requires full,
unanonymized addresses. An option is to anonymize or
zero only part of the IP address (for example, as an op-
tional in LANDER [28]). Such an approach confounds
some number of addresses (256 or 65,000), balancing pri-
vacy while allowing trafﬁc to be matched with large orga-
nizations. Matching data to organizations facilities some
kinds of research, such as that comparing home, business,
or academic use.
We classify two types of data (address scans and active
IP addresses) as containing general addresses. By this term
we mean they are IP addresses that are in use over some
period but they are not associated with any other network
information. In this sense, we believe they represent a re-
duced threat against privacy, particular if the period of use
is broad (say, one week) and the survey size large. A good
analogy is a list of phone numbers in a large city that were
allocated or placed calls some time over a week—without
4speciﬁc times, call durations, or destinations, it is hard to
see how they could be resolved to identiﬁcation of an indi-
vidual. Yet, there is signiﬁcant value in this kind of infor-
mation to addressing basic questions about Internet demo-
graphics and address utilization [26].
Finally, it is important to note that even without user data
and with anonymized addresses, some information may
leak. For example, OS ﬁngerprinting tools such as p0f may
still be used on a trace to determine the type of OS of a par-
ticular sender. Others have shown that clock drift can be an-
alyzed and used to characterize hosts traces, including some
based on clock drift analysis [34], or inference from regu-
lar patterns in scanners [49]. While researchers typically
respond to ﬁx explicit vulnerabilities relatively quickly, it is
much harder to defend against unknown attacks that may be
devised in the future [49].
The tension between analysis and privacy creates many
difﬁcult challenges. How much privacy are we willing to
trade-off for better analysis? The answer can change dras-
tically based on the context. This range of challenges has
suggested that, rather than a simple policy (for example,
renumber all IP addresses), a set of anonymization rules
are required that can reﬂect context and more complex
anonymization policies [50, 7, 49]. Such a framework is
important, but leaves open how policies are to be deﬁned. It
also assumes well known, pre-deﬁned data structures; such
systems cannot cover transfer of unstructured or unknown
user data, and so in these cases they must fall back to either
removing, replacing with a hash, or encrypting such data.
Finally, covert channels of information leakage may still ex-
ist even after anonymization. For example, identifying the
busiest machine as a web or ﬁle server.
4.2 Unavailable Data
Table 2 lists several data types as currently unavailable.
Typically this limitation is because of concerns about pri-
vacy, unknown approaches to anonymization, or availability
of data only to commercial sources.
Full packet contents are unavailable because of clear pri-
vacy concerns. While it seems unlikely that full packet
contents can be made available in general in any but un-
usual situations, some consideration has been given to how
to anonymize full packet contents, although they have not
yet reached their goal [49].
Local inference, either alerts from intrusion detection
systems, or system logs is somewhat more promising. In
fact, LogAnalysis provides sample system logs [5], but ap-
parently with quite limited coverage. Other community
supported repositories such as Dshield [66] provide user-
contributed ﬁrewall logs and some analysis tools. Such ef-
forts are invaluable, but information is not available in real-
time making them better suited for post-mortem analysis.
To the extent they represent criminal behavior (for exam-
ple, spam, or break-in or denial-of-service attempts), it is
possible they have lowered guarantees of privacy. However,
potential false positives mean even this assumption must be
taken carefully.
DNS requests, or other similar types of network infras-
tructure (perhaps NTP trafﬁc) are again not currently avail-
able because of their uncertain privacy or anonymization
methods. For example, DNS records suggest web browsing
habits that could be tied to individuals or reveal sensitive
information (for example, employees browsing job posting
sites). Yet information about how network infrastructure
is used is of great value in improving network operation.
For example, early studies of DNS revealed several types
of pathological behavior that signiﬁcantly stress on the sys-
tem [16], and recent work has used this infrastructure trafﬁc
to detect spam sources [30]. We hypothesize that they could
be completely divorced of IP addresses and be left without
any way to be identify individuals. However, caution is re-
quired, because prior experience suggests that often careful
analysis can connect seemingly well-anonymized informa-
tion to individuals, as shown when AOL’s release of search
engine records [23].
Finally, in most of these cases large datasets do exist,
but they are only privately available. Often datasets are
kept private because of legal concerns, concerns that they
would release user or company private information, or be-
cause their owners consider them to represent commercially
exploitable information.
4.3 Research Practices
We distinguish research from operations by its focus on
developing new techniques as opposed to applying existing
techniques to new networks. Since the goal of research is to
discover something new, it poses two particular problems in
data collection and analysis.
First, validation of new approaches is difﬁcult yet essen-
tial. While it is relatively easy to guess and try new ap-
proaches, an approach is not solid science until researchers
have been validated that it works, and more importantly,
whyitworks. Theprocessofdeﬁningahypothesis, andtest-
ing it against known data to conﬁrm it behaves as expected.
While in some cases validation can be done “in the lab”
with artiﬁcially generated data or simulations, comparisons
against real-world data are often required to strengthen
claims of correctness and accuracy (we give speciﬁc ex-
amples below). When comparing to ground truth derived
from existing approaches or outside knowledge, validation
almost always requires less strict anonymization. While fu-
ture data collection may target strong anonymization for op-
erations, it must leave opportunities for alternatives, at least
with controlled subsets of data or populations of volunteers.
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weaker anonymization. Spectral approaches to classiﬁca-
tion of denial-of-service attacks into single-source and dis-
tributed are advantageous because they are blind—the op-
erate only on packet timing, not contents [29]. Developing
this approach required knowledge of the behavior of single-
and multi-source attacks, knowledge we could only get if
they were already identiﬁed. In our case, we bootstrapped
our analysis with header-based (non-blind) identiﬁcation,
and followed with simulation and experimental studies.
But header-based analysis depends on more information
(weaker anonymization) than bind spectral analysis—this
approach to validation would have been impossible with
a more adversarial foe. As a second approach, we devel-
opedablindtechniquetodetectpeer-to-peerﬁlesharing[3].
Ideally we would validate this against known peer-to-peer
users, but strong evidence of such activity requires deep
packet inspection. In this example, only packet headers
were available to us, so we fell back on port-based identi-
ﬁcation, although we know many peer-to-peer approaches
now avoid well known ports. This case illustrates how
greater information would have lead to a more deﬁnitive
result.
Second, development of new approaches always requires
iteration in what data is collected. Unless one can store
all observations for all time, data collection always requires
summarizing what is observed, omitting some information.
Anonymization adds another level of intentional omission.
Unfortunately, all too often, important details of the data are
omitted. Although researchers plan data summarization and
anonymization carefully, research is, by deﬁnition, discov-
ering the unknown, so these plans nearly always fall short.
Chances of incomplete can be minimized by extensive plan-
ning before data collection, but this approach greatly in-
creases the cost of research and inevitably decreases the
ability to pursue interesting but unexpected phenomena. Fi-
nally, often researchers simply do not know what data is
important until after several iterations (we thank an anony-
mous reviewer for this observation). We suggest that ﬂexi-
bility and correctness are best when researchers iterate with
data collection and analysis, since iteration means that col-
lection strategies can change as becomes necessary.
We found iteration was essential in our study of Inter-
net address space usage [26]. Table 3 shows the evolution
of the data we save, with signiﬁcant changes as we tried to
use the data to reach conclusions and found that what we
saved was insufﬁcient. We have been studying the Internet
address space for ﬁve years, but our earliest measurements
preserved very little information—just a bitmap of respon-
sive addresses. While responsiveness is the most important
information, it is far from the only information; we have
extended our storage format four times to date. We added
recording of negative (error) replies to understand measure-
ment errors, and then later found negative replies reveal in-
formation about use of router access control lists. This re-
sult was an opportunistic side-effect of the core research
made possible by iteration of analysis and data collection.
Our current format is much more careful to save all data we
receive, even unexpected or invalid data, for future evalua-
tion. While it is possible we were overly na¨ ıve in our initial
data formats, we think it is more likely that this kind of iter-
ation is inherent to the development of data collection. Just
as extensive use of software is part of debugging, use of data
is essential to debugging what is collected.
4.4 A Moving Target and Coverage
Finally, we suggest that continued observation is impor-
tant even when some data already exists.
First, evolving areas of the Internet need continuous data
collection Data collection should not be considered a one-
time activity, but needs to evolve as the Internet does. Re-
peated data collection is essential because most interesting
aspects of the Internet continue to change. Malware, such as
denial-of-service attacks and spam, provide a clear example
of this problem. At one time DoS and spam were quite sim-
ple, depending on ﬂoods from a single host or using open
mail relays. As defenses have improved, these attacks have
evolved. As a result, traces showing this previously com-
mon behavior no longer reﬂect techniques currently in use.
Second, multiple datasets of the same type provide ad-
ditional value. Because of the incredible diversity of the
Internet [55], apparent redundancy in datasets provides an
important ability to conﬁrm observations from one dataset
apply elsewhere. Furthermore, observations from any one
location may be biased by the local trafﬁc mix, network
connectivity, or other factors. Multiple view points are es-
sential. One speciﬁc example of this need has been seen in
studies of AS topologies [57].
5 Open Research Directions
We have made signiﬁcant progress in distributed
datasets, but further work remains.
Better anonymization approaches are still needed. Al-
though current preﬁx-preserving IP addresses anonymiza-
tion seems to work reasonably well, provided care is taken,
additional work is needed to understand how to anonymize
other types of data, potentially including user data [49],
or application-level headers. The ability of HTTP to pass
through ﬁrewalls has made it a convenient encoding for
non-web applications (including streaming media, RealAu-
dio; voice-over-IP, Skype; virtual-private network proto-
cols, and other media). There would be signiﬁcant value
to separating these uses of HTTP as a transport layer from
6Table 3. Evolution of information saved in address scans.
version year information
0 2003 bit per responding addresses, for ICMP echo reply only
0.1 2004 adds TTL, RTT
1 2005 new format: encoded ICMP type and reply code (not all saved), TTL, RTT, for three ICMP message types only
2 2007 new format: full ICMP type and reply code, TTL, RTT, for all valid ICMP message types
2.1 2008 adds pcap capture of all invalid ICMP message types
HTTP as a web application. Better anonymization ap-
proaches have just begun to be explored in recent work-
shops [2, 51].
Complementing anonymization must be understanding
of privacy attacks. As we describe above (Section 4.1),
even widely used anonymization schemes leak some infor-
mation. Understanding how to characterize and mitigate
these kinds of attacks is essential, particularly if we are
to explore weaker forms of anonymization for subsets of
data. The database community has been successful estab-
lishing principles to contain information leakage (for ex-
ample, [45, 42]). Networking researchers have just begun
exploring how these approaches apply to trace analysis, and
if new tools can contain information leakage [46].
Dataset annotations and metadata become increasingly
important as datasets are used and researchers identify pos-
itive or negative features. This problem is well known in
data curation; network-central systems such as DatCat pro-
vide facilities for shared annotations [61]. Metadata is par-
ticularly challenging because, as with what basic data to
capture (Section 4.3), there are many details that could be
captured and only the iteration of multiple research users
identify what is important.
We have focused on datasets for the traditional, wired In-
ternet. Data speciﬁc to other access types—wireless mesh
networks, telephone networks, or even SCADA or sensor
networks. Wirelessandtelephonenetworksareincreasingly
IP-based, but the different mix of applications and use pat-
terns may inﬂuence observations. Some dataset providers
have already focused on wireless-speciﬁc datasets [35].
Finally, although outside the scope of technical chal-
lenges, revisiting the social and legal scope of network trac-
ing is important. Well understood best practices are needed
in passive data observation and in active probing and partic-
ipation: what is it acceptable to observe with what level of
aggregation or anonymization? Even careful active probing
incurs cost on the target, particularly when it is or could be
misunderstood as malicious. What are standards for how to
balance these costs and beneﬁts? When is participation in a
network of malware for research appropriate? When should
network monitoring be subject to human-subjects review
processes such as Institutional Review Boards [67, 21]? Fi-
nally, what are the legal frameworks for data collection, and
what grey areas need clariﬁcation? And given that the Inter-
net spans international borders, how does one consolidate
legal frameworks from different countries? Early explo-
ration here has begun to explore legal questions, but opened
many more [47, 32].
6 Conclusion
This paper has outlined classes of available network
datasets and how that data can support network research.
While there is more data available today than in the past,
supporting new kinds of research will require both new
datasets and new approaches to managing anonymization,
privacy, and the social framework of research. The key
to moving research progress forward is the iteration be-
tween application-driven researcher needs (Section 2 and
new approaches (Section 5) in the context of growing expe-
rience (Section 4). Finally, an important non-technical issue
is developing the appropriate national and international le-
gal framework for distributing network traces, necessitating
close collaboration between researchers, lawyers and policy
makers.
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